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A B S T R ACT. The Irish Party, the organization which represented the constitutional nationalist demand
for home rule for almost fifty years in Westminster, was the most notable victim of the revolution in Ireland,
c. 1916–23. Most of the last generation of Westminster-centred home rule MPs played little part in public
life following the party’s electoral destruction in 1918. This article probes the political thought and actions of
one of the most prominent constitutional nationalists who did seek to alter Ireland’s direction during the
critical years of the war of independence. Stephen Gwynn was a guiding figure behind a number of initiatives
to ‘ save ’ Ireland from the excesses of revolution. Gwynn established the Irish Centre Party in 1919, which
later merged with the Irish Dominion League. From the end of 1919, Gwynn became a leading advocate of
the Government of Ireland Bill, the legislation that partitioned the island. Revolutionary idealism – and,
more concretely, violence – did much to render his reconciliatory efforts impotent. Gwynn’s experiences
between 1919 and 1921 also, however, reveal the paralysing divisions within constitutional nationalism,
which did much to demoralize moderate sentiment further.
As the Great War lurched towards its bloody climax in 1918, the Irish nationalist
maverick, William O’Brien, published a pamphlet proclaiming the death of
the home rule project in Ireland. According to O’Brien, the politics of war had
‘rekindled Irish rancour against England and English rancour against Ireland’, to
the utter ruin of constitutional nationalism.1 This was a far cry from the heady
days of the Edwardian era, when a measure of home rule seemed within reach,
vindicating the strategy of the Irish Party under the leadership of John Redmond.
Riding on the coat-tails of the constitutional crisis sparked by David Lloyd
George’s controversial budget of 1909, which ultimately led to the erasing of the
House of Lords’ absolute veto over Commons legislation, Redmond stood at
the apex of his authority within nationalist Ireland. Expectations ran high that his
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leadership would achieve the goal which eluded even the enigmatic Charles
Stewart Parnell : Irish self-government.
It was, however, a false dawn, as the war eclipsed the home rule project and
provided the context for the destruction of the Irish Party. Another victim of this
process was the imperially minded conciliatory nationalism that Redmond epi-
tomized. Redmond’s imagined Ireland was one reconciled under home rule and
at the heart of the British empire. Sinn Fe´in’s impressive performance in Ireland
in the December 1918 general election pointed to a rather different ideal : one
more radical and separatist. The scale of Sinn Fe´in’s victory appears irrefuta-
ble – seventy-three seats against the Irish Party’s six – with many of its candidates
elected without contest. Yet even with its local organization in terminal decline
during the war years,2 the Irish Party still managed to win one fifth of the total
votes cast, and indeed polled credibly in certain areas.3 The large number
of uncontested constituencies in 1918 renders election returns for Ireland a
problematic gauge of public opinion, but the 220,837 Irish Party votes, alongside
the solid unionist bloc in north-east Ulster, suggest that Sinn Fe´in’s hegemony
was incomplete.4 It also implied that constitutional nationalism perhaps still had a
political base in Ireland – albeit a scattered and demoralized one – despite the
obliteration of the national party.
The last generation of Westminster-centred home rulers have rarely been the
focus of study after 1918. Few played any public role : John Dillon, the Irish
Party’s leader after Redmond’s death in March 1918, retired from public life in
the wake of the electoral massacre, the only course being, as he put it, ‘ to stand
aside and let S[inn] F[e´in] and L[loyd] G[eorge] fight it out ’.5 But not all con-
stitutional nationalists adopted this view as 1919 opened. One of Redmond’s most
prominent supporters rejected the notion that home rulers should stand aside
from the forthcoming battle ; rather, Anglo-Irish relations could yet still be saved
on mutually beneficial lines through innovative political thinking and quick
action.
The proponent of this ideal was Stephen Gwynn, formerly MP for Galway
City, and the most senior Protestant member of the home rule party during its
final decade. Gwynn played an active role in various spheres of Irish public
life, political, literary, and cultural. The focus of this article, though, is his political
career, which provided the Redmondite brand of moderate Irish nationalism
with a brief afterlife. Following Gwynn’s election defeat in 1918, he became
involved in several initiatives to ‘save’ politics from Irish republican and British
militancy. Crucial to these activities was Gwynn’s experience of the Irish
Convention of 1917–18, which brought the Redmondites close to securing a deal
2 As demonstrated in Michael Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish Party : provincial Ireland, 1910–1916
(Oxford, 2005).
3 Michael Laffan, The resurrection of Ireland : the Sinn Fe´in party, 1916–1923 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 165.
4 Paul Bew, ‘Moderate nationalism and the Irish revolution, 1916–1923’,Historical Journal, 42 (1999),
p. 735. 5 F. S. L. Lyons, John Dillon: a biography (London, 1968), p. 455.
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with the dwindling band of southern unionists. Gwynn was drafted into the
Irish Party’s negotiating team at the eleventh hour, replacing John Redmond’s
brother, Willie, who died in battle in Messines in 1917. Gwynn was the logical
substitute : like Willie, he was also a soldier-MP, having served in Europe on
two separate occasions between 1915 and 1917.6 He fully embraced the ideals of
wartime Redmondism: that the common sacrifice of Irishmen, Protestant and
Catholic, in the trenches of Europe had the power to shatter ancient barriers
that kept them bitterly divided at home.7 Prior to the war, Gwynn, like the vast
majority of Irish nationalists, rejected the case for Ulster exceptionalism from a
home rule settlement.8 Serving in the trenches alongside Ulstermen in the face of
a common enemy, however, dramatically altered his political outlook: the bonds
of war prompted him to work more for national reconciliation than national
autonomy. The Irish Convention model, which offered a practical framework
to promote reconciliation, resonated in Gwynn’s mind as he explored the
political landscape of the post-war period. An escape from extremism was
essential for Irish political life, particularly after violent manifestations came to the
fore. Gwynn was appalled at the events of the Easter Rising of 1916: the divisive
nature of republican violence was a central theme of his writings during the
revolutionary period and after. In 1935, he referred to the friendly feeling between
the Irish and Ulster Divisions born ‘ in the mud of Passchendaele ’ : ‘What was
done there was undone later in Ireland. ’9 But from 1919 to 1921, Gwynn did not
take this as a certainty : his efforts to regroup the scattered elements of moderate
Irish politics – ostensibly the two endangered species, the Redmondites and
southern unionists – reveal that he saw nothing inevitable about their eventual
defeat.
The historiography of home rule typically ceases with the 1918 election.10
While Paul Bew has employed the writings of Stephen Gwynn and other sidelined
constitutional nationalists in his examination of the Irish revolution (c. 1916–23),
his analytical gaze focuses on retrospective accounts rather than contemporary
actions.11 It is only in recent decades that scholars have escaped the influential,
but flawed, framework of revolutionary history expressed most persuasively by W.
B. Yeats. This retrospectively over-exaggerated the influence of ‘cultural ’
nationalism to the detriment of the home rule movement in the march to
Irish independence, stressing the Gaelic language and Anglo-Irish literary
revivals as crucial forces in awakening the soul of the nation, culminating in the
6 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond’s last years (London, 1919), pp. 269–70.
7 This ideal was articulated throughout John E. Redmond, The Irish nation and the war : extracts from
speeches made in the House of Commons and in Ireland since the outbreak of the war (Dublin, 1915).
8 See Gwynn’s The case for home rule (Dublin, 1911) for an example of this.
9 Stephen Gwynn, Ireland in ten days (London, 1935), p. 237.
10 An exception to this is Alvin Jackson’s invaluable Home rule : an Irish history, 1800–2000 (London,
2003), which charts the afterlife of home rule in the form of devolution in Northern Ireland.
11 Bew, ‘Moderate nationalism’.
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litterateur-led Rising of 1916.12 But politics did not ‘stop ’ following the fall of
Parnell, contrary to Yeats’s assertion.13 This has been amply demonstrated by
recent research stressing the vitality of the Redmondite project, the Irish Party’s
grip over provincial Ireland, and expectations of the emerging generation of
young home rulers during the Edwardian period.14 But the lingering afterlife of
constitutional nationalism has escaped the attention of many historians of the
Irish war of independence (1919–21).15 Scholarly interest in this period clusters
around the dynamics of the Irish armed struggle, construction of the revolution-
ary administration, and British military reactions.16 This research has been sup-
plemented with a burgeoning body of local studies highlighting substantial
regional variations of the conflict,17 and a number of compelling biographical
studies of the revolutionary elite.18 In marked contrast to this dynamic literature,
the losing side of the Irish revolution – constitutional nationalism – has been ne-
glected, with the moderate nationalist critique of the republican campaign and its
alternative political programme lost amidst the revolutionary narrative. Between
1919 and 1921, as in the aftermath of Parnell’s fall, constitutional politics did not
stop. Indeed, politics remained in a state of flux from the immediate aftermath of
the 1918 election to the truce between republican and crown forces in July 1921,
with Sinn Fe´in in no way certain of achieving its separatist ambitions. New
formations of constitutional nationalism surfaced during the war of indepen-
dence, providing a coda of sorts for the Irish Party. The bloodshed of the period,
however, undermined the power of constitutional nationalism, which lacked the
urgency and active support to alter the course of conflict. Moreover, violence also
exacerbated the difficulties of including Ulster in a political settlement, a problem
to which Sinn Fe´in offered no viable solution. Crucially, the scholarly neglect
of post-1918 constitutional nationalism has had the net effect of underplaying
12 As expressed most forcibly during Yeats’s lecture from 1923, ‘The Irish dramatic movement ’,
reprinted in Autobiographies, ed. William H. O’Donnell and Douglas N. Archibald (London, 1999),
p. 410. 13 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600–1972 (London, 1988), pp. 431–3.
14 Paul Bew, Conflict and conciliation in Ireland, 1890–1910: Parnellites and radical agrarians (Oxford, 1987) ;
Paul Bew, Ideology and the Irish question: Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism, 1912–1916 (Oxford, 1994) ;
Patrick Maume, The long gestation : Irish nationalist life, 1891–1918 (Dublin, 1999) ; Wheatley, Nationalism and
the Irish Party ; Senia Pasˇeta, Before the revolution: nationalism, social change and Ireland’s Catholic elite, 1879–1922
(Cork, 1999).
15 A notable exception is Senia Pasˇeta, ‘ Ireland’s last home rule generation: the decline of consti-
tutional nationalism in Ireland, 1916–1930’, in Mike Cronin and John M. Regan, eds., Ireland : the
politics of independence, 1922–1949 (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 13–31.
16 The best examples of each of these themes are Peter Hart, The IRA and its enemies : violence and
community in Cork, 1916–1923 (Oxford, 1998) ; Arthur Mitchell, Revolutionary government in Ireland: Da´il
E´ireann, 1919–1922 (Dublin, 1995) ; and Charles Townshend, The British campaign in Ireland, 1919–1921: the
development of political and military policies (Oxford, 1975).
17 The classic example is David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life : provincial experience of war and revolution
(Dublin, 1977) ; but also see Hart, The IRA and its enemies ; and Marie Coleman, County Longford and the
Irish revolution, 1910–1923 (Dublin, 2001).
18 See, for example, Peter Hart, Mick : the real Michael Collins (London, 2005) ; Richard English, Ernie
O’Malley : IRA intellectual (Oxford, 1998) ; Fearghal McGarry, Eoin O’Duffy: a self-made hero (Oxford,
2005).
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contemporary criticisms of the divisiveness of the republican armed campaign.
This article explores these themes through an examination of the thought,
actions, and writings of one of the revolution’s losers. Gwynn offered an original
analysis of the Ulster problem from a nationalist framework during the years
of the war of independence; he was also a prominent critic of the excesses of
republican – and British – violence.
I
The loss of his parliamentary seat in December 1918 did not dampen Gwynn’s
enthusiasm to remain in public life, in contrast to the majority of his former
Irish Party colleagues. Shortly after his election defeat, Gwynn contacted Lord
Midleton, the leader of southern unionism, outlining his intention to raise a new
political movement from the ashes of moderate nationalism and unionism.
Midleton had been a major influence in pushing for southern unionism’s ac-
ceptance of a home rule settlement during the Irish Convention: Gwynn pinned
hopes on him that a ‘Convention party ’ could be established to find a middle way
between the extremes of Sinn Fe´in and Ulster unionism. The vehicle to settle Irish
differences, Gwynn told Midleton, was a new organization to promote Irish
self-government while recognizing the distinctiveness of Ulster : in other words,
federalism.19 On the final day of 1918, the Freeman’s Journal published a letter from
Gwynn calling for the formation of a federalist party. What was urgently needed,
he argued, was a new moderate organization to attract nationalists and unionists
under a federal banner, imbued with the spirit of the Irish Convention.20
Federalism – in its many different guises – was a political programme which
periodically appealed to Irish nationalists in the decades after the Act of Union.
Gwynn, for one, dabbled with federal ideas throughout his career. Whilst in
London during the Boer war period, he encountered the renowned English im-
perialist and constitutional thinker, F. S. Oliver, and they subsequently enjoyed
an enduring friendship based on a mutual obsession with politics.21 Oliver was a
prominent figure in the Round Table, the group established in 1909 to promote
federalism as a step to imperial unity.22 With the political crisis unleashed by
Lloyd George’s ‘People’s Budget ’ in 1909 threatening the very constitution of
Britain, ideas of ‘home rule all round’ gained currency within certain imperialist
political circles : federalization of the United Kingdom emerged as a potential
means to preserve the unity of the Union and empire. Oliver was an important
figure in popularizing the discourse of federalism during the Edwardian period ;
his influence on Gwynn can be gleaned from the Irishman’s support for
‘home rule all round’ as a potential compromise to the constitutional stalemate in
19 Gwynn to Midleton, n.d. [Dec. 1918], London, The National Archives (TNA), Midleton papers,
PRO 30/67/39. 20 Freeman’s Journal, 31 Dec. 1918.
21 Stephen Gwynn, Experiences of a literary man (London, 1926), p. 223. Gwynn later edited an edition
of Oliver’s letters : The anvil of war : letters between F. S. Oliver and his brother, 1914–1918 (London, 1936).
22 John Kendle, The Round Table movement and imperial union (Toronto, 1975).
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1910.23 Gwynn’s early interest in federalism was based on the notion that Ireland
and Britain should be treated as a unitary administrative unit with autonomous
regional assembles. But Gwynn recognized Ireland as one unit, not two, in the
pre-war period: he had little to say about the position of Ulster in such a scheme,
and only moved towards the idea of internal Irish federalism after the Easter Rising
as a means to secure a speedy enactment of self-government. Federalist schemes
were, however, controversially received within nationalist Ireland.24 Francis
Cruise O’Brien, for example, voiced discomfort with the principle of ‘home rule
all round’ in a response to Oliver’s proposals : ‘A federated United Kingdom
supposes that English and Irish interests are identical. History has something
to say on the point. ’25 Although a solution with a federal heart was rendered
redundant by the introduction of the more straightforward ‘Gladstonian’ home
rule bill in April 1912, the use of federalism to recognize regional differences whilst
sustaining a unitary state loomed large in Gwynn’s mind as the Irish question
mutated throughout the next decade.
The grandeur of Gwynn’s post-war federalist vision was, however, almost
immediately deflated with Lord Midleton’s rejection of his terms; instead,
Midleton led a split within unionism and established a separate organization,
the Anti-Partition League.26 Gwynn, however, remained undeterred by such a
conspicuous snubbing. Several days later, he appeared at an ‘Irish Federalism
versus Irish Republic ’ debate in Dublin’s Abbey Theatre, where he insisted, to a
packed audience, that the key issue facing Irish nationalists was the north : the
Ulster question was Sinn Fe´in’s Achilles’ heel, for which it offered no solution.
The natural outcome of Sinn Fe´in’s drive for an Irish republic, argued Gwynn,
was ‘one which was fatal to Irish unity, because Ulster would never agree to it ’ ;
Sinn Fe´in’s ‘conception of nationality was narrow and tribal ’. Federalism was
advocated as the only available political bridge to link Ulster with southern
Ireland. Gwynn’s republican opponent for the evening, P. S. O’Hegarty, merely
dismissed the existence of an ‘Ulster question’, which reflected the audience’s
general feeling.27
On 21 January 1919, two events occurred which have traditionally been inter-
preted as marking the opening of the Irish war of independence : the first meeting
of the underground parliament, Da´il E´ireann, and the murder of two police
constables by the Irish Volunteers (soon to be rechristened the Irish Republican
Army) at Soloheadbeg, county Tipperary.28 Against this unpropitious backdrop,
the Irish Centre Party was launched several days later, with Gwynn named
chair of its provisional general committee. The Centre Party was a small body
23 ‘Pacificus’ [F. S. Oliver], Federalism and home rule (London, 1910) ; Hansard, 5th series, XVI, 11 Apr.
1910, col. 929.
24 See, for example, Michael Wheatley, ‘ John Redmond and federalism in 1910’, Irish Historical
Studies, 32 (2001), pp. 343–64. 25 Leader, 22 Oct. 1910.
26 Midleton to Gwynn, 30 Dec. 1918, TNA, Midleton papers, PRO 30/67/39.
27 Irish Times, 6 Jan. 1919.
28 Michael Hopkinson, The Irish war of independence (Dublin, 2002), p. 25.
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dominated by professional men and women, several of whom were well known,
but most with little or no experience of public life. The party’s notables included
the barrister, W. E. Wylie, the academic, Charles Oldham, and, most promi-
nently, the army general, Sir Hubert Gough.29 Gough was the brigadier-general
who had voiced concerns about being sent to suppress Ulster unionism in 1914 at
the height of the home rule crisis. The ‘Curragh incident ’, as it became known,
confirmed that the government could not be used to enforce home rule in Ulster :
Gough headed a body of cavalry officers who announced that they would resign if
ordered north. The Great War, however, changed Gough’s outlook on Irish
politics. After serving in Europe with Gwynn, Willie Redmond, and other
nationalists, Gough came to believe that unionism and nationalism in Ireland
could be reconciled under a measure of home rule.30 He refused an offer made
by Sir Edward Carson to stand as an Ulster unionist MP in the 1918 election ;
instead, as Gough announced in a public letter, he was now committed to
‘brotherhood and conciliation’ in Ireland, which he believed could be achieved
through the Centre Party.31 This was Redmondism without Redmond, the very
sentiment that Gwynn attempted to mine over the next few years.
The Centre Party’s federal programme recognized that the Irish constitutional
debate had fundamentally altered since the Edwardian period. The party’s
primary aim was not to redesign the Union to accommodate Ireland, but instead
to reconcile Ireland’s internal divisions. The party advanced a programme
advocating the creation of a self-governing Ireland within the British empire, with
a central parliament for national affairs and four provincial assemblies to tackle
local issues. This had been the basis of a scheme that the Irish Convention
received from Joseph Alexander Moles, an Ulster-born businessman, which
Gwynn immediately supported.32 Gwynn’s attempt to convert Redmond to this
form of thinking in 1917 was, however, unsuccessful.33 In his review of the
Convention in 1919, Gwynn lamented that ‘ there was a strong feeling against
anything that looked like partition’, but he was adamant that federalism was
something that should ‘have been much more fully explored ’,34 which was what
he intended to do with the Centre Party. It could be argued that Gwynn
was underestimating the seemingly intractable Ulster problem with federal
abstractions, but this is to miss his point. In the summer of 1919, he argued that
‘ Ireland, if it includes Ulster, is today not a nation in being. It is only the makings
of a nation. ’35 Given that he recognized Ulster’s concerns with the Irish
self-governing project, Gwynn’s emphasis on the need for four provincial parlia-
ments may seem superfluous ; but he envisaged a federal framework for Ireland’s
29 Irish Independent, 24 Jan. 1919.
30 General Sir Hubert Gough, Soldiering on (London, 1954), p. 182.
31 Freeman’s Journal, 25 Jan. 1919.
32 Copies of this scheme have survived in London, Parliamentary Archives (PA), Lloyd George
papers, LG/F/137/6/8 and Oxford, Bodleian Library, H. E. Duke papers, dep. C. 715 (115-41).
33 Gwynn to Redmond, 24 Oct. [1917], Dublin, National Library of Ireland (NLI), John Redmond
papers, MS 15,192/9. 34 Gwynn, Redmond’s last years, p. 286. 35 Observer, 27 July 1919.
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constitutional design as the means for the provinces to meet on an equal footing,
thereby weakening Ulster’s sense of ‘difference’ and fostering an all-island
unity.36
Disappointingly for Gwynn, though, his plan failed to reignite the wider federal
debates of the Edwardian period within influential British constitutional circles.
In the aftermath of the war, the eyes of political thinkers in Britain were firmly on
the peace conference in Paris, with most attention paid to the formation of the
League of Nations and the growth of dominion governments.37 The Round
Table, through their journal, reported on the Centre Party’s founding, but in
rather downbeat terms. Citing a lack of popular support within Ireland as the
major problem facing the Centre Party, the Round Table also asserted that creation
of four provincial assemblies would not reconcile the north-eastern counties of
Ulster to rule from a central Dublin parliament.38 This pessimistic assessment was
coloured by the rise of Sinn Fe´in, whose narrow and unrepentant appeal to Irish
nationalism encountered increasing disillusionment on the part of British feder-
alist observers.39 Gwynn’s efforts to build a federalist political party in Ireland
thus went largely unsupported in those British circles from which he might have
expected intellectual and material encouragement.
The Centre Party was a small organization: as Gwynn lamented, his new
movement was ‘much better off for brains than for money’.40 But in March 1919,
Gwynn gained an opportunity to reach a mass audience though his appointment
as special Irish correspondent of The Observer, the London-based Sunday paper.
Appearing weekly until the first half of 1925 and more sporadically thereafter,
Gwynn’s crisply written Observer articles offered piercing commentaries on the
subsequent course of politics in Ireland, north and south. The first few articles
were wide-ranging in scope : the plight of ex-soldiers (Gwynn was also a member
of the short-lived Irish Demobilization Committee) ; John Redmond’s vision of
Irish unity ; and the need for progressive social policies in Ireland. These discus-
sions partly reflected, as he recognized, the disquieting lack of political activity in
early 1919.41 Throughout the year, Gwynn identified a dangerously apathetic
British policy towards Ireland as a major obstacle in the path of moderate pol-
itical figures, but reasoned that the Irish question could nevertheless still be solved
on federal lines. The context in which Gwynn made this claim should not be lost :
militarily, there was no ‘war of independence’. Violent activities by republicans
remained erratic for some time after the Soloheadbeg assault, with Sinn Fe´in
unwilling to escalate the conflict and most IRA efforts focusing on seizing weap-
ons and ammunition from the police.42 Amidst this lull, Gwynn argued that the
time had come for home rule with a federal twist to pre-empt Sinn Fe´in’s further
36 Ibid., 31 Aug. 1919. 37 Kendle, Round Table, pp. 248–73.
38 Round Table, 9 (1918–19), p. 583.
39 G. K. Peatling, ‘The last defence of the Union? The Round Table and Ireland, 1910–1925’, in
Andrea Bosco and Alex May, eds., The Round Table : the empire/commonwealth and British foreign policy
(London, 1997), p. 291. 40 Observer, 23 Mar. 1919. 41 Ibid., 2, 9, 23 Mar. 1919.
42 Townshend, British campaign in Ireland, pp. 19–20.
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growth; British failure to enact home rule would demonstrate to the Irish, he
prompted, that ‘ the separatists were right ’.43
This was a point that Gwynn understood only too well while attempting to
spread the Centre Party’s vision. At a meeting in March in Newry, county Down,
Gwynn was interrupted during an address focusing on the workings of federalism
in the British dominions, Switzerland, and the United States of America. When
challenged about his commitment to the ‘Irish nation ’, Gwynn responded an-
grily :
‘We will never have a nation’ the Captain [Gwynn] replied, ‘until we are united and that
is what we are out to accomplish. ’ (General disorder, cheers and cries of ‘Sit down, John
Bull ’ and ‘Ireland is one and undivided. ’) ‘She is anything but that ’, observed Captain
Gwynn, who added: ‘She is totally divided. ’
The message was lost in the confusion: Gwynn was howled down and forced to
conclude his speech prematurely.44 Creating a meaningful centrist party during
1919 was a testing experience, and the difficulties Gwynn encountered may have
prompted him to merge his organization with Sir Horace Plunkett’s newly
formed movement, the Irish Dominion League.
Plunkett was the founder and leader of the Irish co-operative movement : his
Edwardian modus operandi was concentration on economic development, rather
than the national question. His path had crossed with Gwynn’s during the Irish
Convention, which Plunkett chaired. Fearing the growth of post-war political
extremism, Plunkett launched the Irish Dominion League in June 1919, partnered
by a weekly ‘unofficial ’ organ, The Irish Statesman.45 Plunkett claimed he had
contacts inside the moderate wing of Sinn Fe´in, from which he believed that a
majority within the new nationalism would accept dominion home rule – in other
words, a full measure of self-government – encompassing the entire island of
Ireland.46 Gwynn warmly greeted Plunkett’s ideas, particularly after Plunkett
conceded that ‘ there would be ample room for provincial rights ’ within an Irish
dominion. Gwynn took this to mean that ‘ the idea of a settlement which would
give to Ulster what Quebec has in Canada appears to be gaining ground’ ;47 but
this federal analogy was a marked over-reading of Plunkett’s position. Gwynn’s
public support for Plunkett’s dominion scheme came after private negotiations
between the three moderate political movements in Ireland – Plunkett and his
followers, Lord Midleton’s Anti-Partition League, and Gwynn’s Centre
Party – were held with the view of constructing unity of purpose. Midleton de-
cided to remain aloof, but Gwynn and Plunkett reached agreement and decided
to merge their organizations. As Warre B. Wells, editor of The Irish Statesman and
participant at the negotiations, later observed, however, Plunkett was uneasy with
Gwynn’s insistence that Ulster be afforded special constitutional conditions
43 Observer, 9 Mar. 1919. 44 Irish Independent, 8 Mar. 1919.
45 Irish Statesman, 5 July 1919, claimed independence from the Dominion League, but Plunkett was
bankrolling the paper. Sir Horace Plunkett dairies (microfilm), 2 June 1919, Belfast Central Library
(BCL). 46 Pasˇeta, ‘ Ireland’s last home rule generation’, p. 24. 47 Observer, 20 Apr. 1919.
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within an all-Ireland settlement ; Plunkett certainly would not have adopted the
Canadian parallel.48 The difficulties posed by Ulster threatened the harmony
between Gwynn and Plunkett from the beginning of their joint venture, and
eventually split the movement amidst rising levels of political violence in Ireland
over the next two years.
The first edition of The Irish Statesman carried the Irish Dominion League’s
manifesto, stating that the movement’s primary aim was to establish self-
government for Ireland within the empire. Once this was achieved, Irish rep-
resentation at Westminster would cease, and Ireland would take its place along-
side the other British dominions in the newly founded League of Nations.
Minority rights would be protected within the dominion settlement, and the
manifesto made a direct appeal to Ulster unionism to express what ‘ special
safeguards they demand’.49 Boasting an impressive and diverse cast of supporters,
such as Lords Monteagle and Fingall, Henry Harrison, and Francis Cruise
O’Brien, the Dominion League, Gwynn believed, had become ‘ the rallying point
of a new constitutional movement in Ireland’.50 The Centre Party merged with
the Dominion League a week before the manifesto was published.51 The
Dominion League’s demand for dominion status represented much more than
the Centre Party’s federalist scheme; moderate Irish nationalist opinion had
advanced dramatically since the days of the limited freedoms of home rule.
Reaction to the Dominion League’s programme was, however, uniformly
negative. Plunkett’s initiative, which aimed to bridge the philosophies of unionism
and nationalism, was successful in only one measure : both were united in disdain
of the League. Unsurprised at the negative response which greeted the Dominion
League, Gwynn suggested in The Observer that many Irish people believed the
British government would soon have to deal constructively with Ireland: it would
thereby offer more concessions if confronted with Sinn Fe´in’s demand for a re-
public, rather than with the League’s more pragmatic approach.52 Gwynn offered
no ideas as to how to alter this scenario, which perhaps contained more than a
hint of truth. In terms of bargaining positions, the Dominion League had left itself
with little room to manoeuvre after publicly declaring that its programme re-
presented ‘ the irreducible minimum of the Irish demand’.53 But the League also
faced a challenge to be taken seriously by both the British government and Irish
electorate following an upsurge of revolutionary violence in the summer of 1919.
Several days after the Centre Party merged with the Dominion League, a Royal
Irish Constabulary (RIC) district inspector was shot in the head in broad daylight
in Thurles, county Tipperary. Such attacks thereafter became more widespread,
48 Warre B. Wells, Irish indiscretions (London, 1922), pp. 90–1.
49 Irish Statesman, 28 June 1919. 50 Observer, 29 June 1919.
51 See the letter from Gwynn to Plunkett, 20 June 1919, published in the New Statesman, 5 July 1919;
Observer, 29 June 1919. 52 Observer, 6 July 1919.
53 Irish Statesman, 12 July 1919. To further this point, the emphasis is found in the original.
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and the constitutional thinking propounded by the Dominion League lost much
of its energy in the face of a violent alternative.
Following the Thurles murder, the lord lieutenant of Ireland, Lord French,
pushed successfully for more draconian measures to counter Sinn Fe´in. The
organization was made illegal (along with other nationalist bodies, such as the
Gaelic League) in Tipperary, a particular hotspot of conflict. Throughout
the summer of 1919, the IRA intensified its campaign against the RIC, leading to
the national suppression of Da´il E´ireann and Sinn Fe´ı´n in September. Moderates
such as Gwynn were horrified at the turn of events, fearing that the political
vacuum would be filled only by ‘murders in plenty’.54 After a month of inactivity,
the government finally decided to grasp the nettle by introducing an Irish in-
itiative to undermine Sinn Fe´in’s support. The resultant Government of Ireland
Act would formally divide the island into two administrative areas ; Gwynn’s
influence can be detected in its rationale, as he moved into yet another mode to
shore up moderate nationalist politics in Ireland and halt the divisive course of
political extremism.
I I
At the end of September 1919, the British cabinet was informed that the home
rule bill of 1914 – suspended for the war’s duration – would come into force fol-
lowing ratification of the final peace treaties in Europe. Irish opinion had mutated
so much since August 1914 that the bill would have been a wholly inadequate
measure to confront the difficulties of establishing Irish self-government in 1919,
a point the cabinet conceded.55 Moderate opinion was now campaigning for
dominion status for Ireland, which was a substantial departure from the
Asquithian pre-war measure, and the question of Ulster still had to be addressed.
More worryingly for British policy makers, Sinn Fe´in’s drive for a republic also
showed little sign of abating. After a year of inactivity, the government was forced
to tackle the Irish problem directly : a committee under Sir Walter Long’s chair-
manship was established to investigate suitable forms of governance for Ireland.
Long’s standing in London’s high political circles made him a natural choice to
head the new committee – at least from a British perspective.56 But his selection
further antagonized nationalist opinion as he was, after all, a former leader of
the unionist party and a vocal opponent of home rule. Gwynn, however, ex-
pressed satisfaction with the committee’s composition, informing Observer readers
that ‘ to have Mr Long committed to the support of a Home Rule scheme is the
best possible proof of how far and how permanently public opinion in Great
Britain has advanced on the whole matter. This Ireland does not realise ’.57 But
54 Observer, 10, 17 Aug., 21 Sept. 1919.
55 Cabinet conclusions, 25 Sept. 1919, TNA CAB/23/12.
56 John Kendle, Walter Long, Ireland and the Union, 1905–1920 (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), p. 181.
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any logic in Gwynn’s case was lost in the aftermath of the committee’s deliverance
of its findings in December 1919. Long’s committee declared that home rule
should provide the constitutional framework to an Irish settlement, but Ulster
should receive a substantial concession in the form of partition and its own par-
liament. Long’s report provided the skeleton of the Government of Ireland Bill of
the following year.
Partition was long a blasphemy to Irish nationalism; the constitutional framing
of such a policy further dented nationalist Ireland’s confidence in the British state.
But Gwynn had come to believe that the partition of Ireland reflected political
realities, and he emerged as the scheme’s most vocal supporter from within the
wider nationalist family. Replying to criticisms of his pro-partitionist thinking
made by the Irish Independent, Gwynn, himself a Protestant Ulsterman, argued that
the north-eastern counties could never be assimilated with the rest of Ireland ‘any
more than Quebec to the rest of Canada’. The logic of this claim was that Ulster
should be granted its own institutions as ‘a necessary stepping-stone to securing
Ulster’s full concurrence and assistance in the general control and direction of
Irish nationalist affairs ’.58 There was also another dimension to Gwynn’s advo-
cacy of partition, namely the nature of republican coercion. The IRA’s violent
campaign against the state merely confirmed Protestant Ulster’s sense of differ-
ence from nationalist Ireland. As Gwynn insisted in The Observer, the excesses of
republicanism had ‘made Ulster’s case for them as they could never have made it
for themselves ’.59 Such thinking was, however, antithetical to the views of the
Dominion League. Plunkett chaired a League meeting convened in November
which rejected Long’s proposals ; although Gwynn was unable to attend, he in-
dicated that he supported the creation of two parliaments which would at least
place the government of the entire island into Irish hands. ‘ If this proposal is put
forward’, Gwynn told Plunkett in advance of the meeting, ‘I shall support it by all
means in my power. ’60 Yet the chances that the Dominion League would also
support such a scheme were slim: Plunkett fiercely rejected partition, believing
that ‘ it would plunge Ireland into rebellion ’.61 The differences between Gwynn
and Plunkett became more pronounced when The Irish Statesman publicly attacked
Gwynn’s belief that ‘ there are two Irelands ’.62
Somewhat fittingly, amidst these emerging disputes within moderate
nationalism over partition, Gwynn’s John Redmond’s last years was published at the
end of 1919. Gwynn was the author of numerous books, but Redmond’s last years is
his most outstanding literary achievement, offering as it does a lucid insight into
the final phase of the Irish Party from the third home rule bill to the death of
Redmond in 1918. The book established Redmond as a totemic figure for
58 Irish Independent, 15 Oct. 1919. 59 Observer, 2 Nov. 1919.
60 Gwynn to Plunkett, 18 Nov. 1919, Lord Lothian papers, Edinburgh, National Archives of
Scotland (NAS), GD40/17/610/2(i).
61 Sir Horace Plunkett diaries (microfilm), 20 Nov. 1919, BCL. 62 Irish Statesman, 29 Nov. 1919.
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Gwynn’s own particular post-war brand of pluralistic and conciliatory politics :
Redmond’s imperialism and sincere tolerance, two traits close to Gwynn’s heart,
were emphasized throughout. Crucially, though, the book critiqued Irish Party
strategy during the Ulster crisis years of 1912 to 1914, subtly arguing that
Redmond’s refusal to consider partition as a solution at an earlier stage of the
impasse contributed to the downfall of constitutional nationalism in 1918. The
striking conclusion was that the Irish Party was not entirely blameless, a form of
historical revisionism notably lacking in subsequent accounts from other
Redmondites, such as William O’Malley and John Valentine, who only meekly
pointed to external factors in explaining the party’s destruction.63 The book’s
most controversial passage concerned the temporary partition proposals mooted
on the eve of the Great War: here, Gwynn’s argument unmistakably reflected
more the political situation of 1919 than that of 1914. Gwynn argued that the Irish
Party should have conceded Ulster unionism’s demand for a permanent division
in the hope that it would attract moderate opinion in the north and further the
long-term cause of reconciliation within Ireland.64 The logic of this reassessment,
however, needs to be weighed against contemporary political possibilities.
Gwynn’s retrospective analysis has been deemed a ‘serious argument, coming as
it does from the pen of one of Redmond’s most trusted and talented colleagues ’.65
It was, but it should not be overplayed. Gwynn’s hypothetical assessment
was more a reflection of his post-1916 thinking on the Ulster question than a
constructive criticism of the Irish Party’s policy in 1914. He was, in essence,
imposing post-war politics on his reading of pre-war Ireland.
Around the time of the publication of Redmond’s last years, Gwynn opened a
correspondence with a key member of the British government’s inner circle,
Lloyd George’s private secretary, Philip Kerr (the future Lord Lothian). Kerr was
a long-standing member of the Round Table movement and a key influence on
the prime minister on imperial and foreign affairs.66 He hoped that moderate
politics in Ireland could be rebuilt to accommodate a home rule settlement,
thereby undermining Sinn Fe´in’s radicalism. To this end, Gwynn reported to
Kerr that the government should embark on Long’s partitioned home rule
scheme as the basis for a settlement : if it did so, the Lloyd George administration
could expect the support of several prominent, if woefully unrepresentative, in-
dividuals, such as the Trinity College provost, J. H. Bernard, and the Maynooth
scholar, Walter McDonald. Gwynn also prompted Kerr to send a copy of
McDonald’s new book, Some ethical questions of peace and war, to the prime minister,
as, he claimed, it ‘makes the case for partition out of Celtic history ’.67 This was a
bold claim, but Ethical questions was an intrepid book, and the prime minister took
63 William O’Malley, Glancing back : 70 years’ experiences and reminiscences of press man, sportsman and
member of parliament (London, [1933]), p. 137 ; John Valentine, Irish memories (Bristol, n.d.), p. 58.
64 Gwynn, Redmond’s last years, p. 103. 65 Paul Bew, John Redmond (Dundalk, 1996), p. 35.
66 John Grigg, Lloyd George : war leader, 1916–1918 (London, 2003; first published 2002), p. 231.
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Gwynn’s advice. Introducing the government’s partition proposals in the House
of Commons, Lloyd George quoted McDonald’s key argument :
The Protestants of Ulster differ from the majority in the rest of the island, not only in
religion, but in race, mentality, culture generally … A minority in Ireland, they are a
majority in the north-east corner, and therefore, on the principles which we have been
advocating, are entitled to home rule.68
Through Kerr, Gwynn obtained a line of communication with the prime minis-
ter ; but whether Lloyd George would always listen was another matter.
Sinn Fe´in ignored the government’s scheme, while the Dominion League re-
jected it ; within nationalist Ireland, Gwynn was isolated on the issue. His support
for partition should not be seen as a sudden conversion to unionism, or even to a
‘ two nations theory ’. Gwynn believed that partition could be used as the means
to create the circumstances for a future unitary settlement ; Ulster unionism in-
terpreted it as an end in itself. Gwynn’s stance was realpolitik in time of revolution,
a realization that the proposals were simply the best that could be gained from the
Conservative-dominated coalition. Gwynn recognized that unionist–nationalist
relations were severely damaged by the pre-war home rule crisis (partly due to the
Irish Party’s unwillingness to concede to unionist demands) ; republican extrem-
ism exacerbated and entrenched Irish divisions in the post-war period. In this
environment, Irish self-government was imperative to rebuild the centre ground
and find a common unity of purpose amongst moderate men, north and south. In
an article for the Manchester Guardian in January 1920, Gwynn argued – with an
echo of Michael Collins’s later defence of the Anglo-Irish Treaty – that the gov-
ernment’s proposals could eventually lead to the ultimate freedom Ireland
sought.69 Gwynn desired as much legislative power as possible in Irish hands; but
since a republic was an impossible dream and deeply repugnant to Ulster
unionism, whilst the government’s lack of interest in conceding dominion status
was politically bankrupting the Dominion League, a revised form of home rule
became the logical compromise. The shifts in political positions made by Gwynn
through 1919 – federalism to dominion status to partition – were not due to lack
of principle, but rather to a realization of the limitations of both British states-
manship and Irish nationalism.
The government’s adoption of Long’s scheme was accompanied by an upsurge
in IRA violence. Gwynn’s Observer column of 29 February 1920 opened with the
grim pronouncement that ‘ [t]here is now quite definitely war in Ireland’.70 This
commentary followed the IRA’s decision to besiege several police barracks
around the country and a reactive intensification of the British military
effort. Amidst deteriorating security, the cabinet agreed to accept the Ulster un-
ionists’ preference for a six-county (rather than Long’s proposed nine-county)
68 Hansard, 5th series, 22 Dec. 1919, CXXIII, col. 1173; Walter McDonald, Some ethical questions of peace
and war : with special reference to Ireland (Dublin, 1919), p. 70. 69 Manchester Guardian, 5 Jan. 1920.
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arrangement for the northern administrative area of the Government of Ireland
Bill, which was greeted with horror within the Dominion League.71 Gwynn had
severe reservations about the partitioning of Ulster, but understood the logic of
the unionist party’s ‘play for safety ’ in the face of republican violence.72 The
crucial point for Gwynn, though, was that ‘on the question of Irish unity it gets
England out of the way’, permitting the space for Irishmen north and south to
deal constructively with each other to ensure partition would be limited in its
operation.73 In his diary, Plunkett sardonically recorded that Gwynn’s well-pub-
licized support for the bill was ‘a great help to the Coalition Government ’.74 But
Plunkett only knew half of the ‘great help ’. As well as his propaganda work,
Gwynn was also supplying Kerr with information and advice on the Irish situ-
ation, which was incorporated into the design of the partition legislation. Aware
of criticisms which the bill was attracting in Ireland, Kerr looked to Gwynn for
moral support as legislative details were being addressed. Gwynn confidently
informed Kerr that the bill represented the best way to secure self-government in
Ireland:
Nobody likes partition. But if self-government is to be started it can be only on a dual
basis … The choice made is dictated by a desire to forward Irish unity. Irishmen are more
likely to come together if dealing direct with one another and if self-government exists both
in Ulster and the rest.75
Amidst the sobering reality of Irish politics, this was an extremely optimistic view;
the great handicap was the lack of domestic support for the scheme in Ireland.
After Gwynn argued in The Observer that the Government of Ireland Bill’s fi-
nancial terms would benefit Ireland by lowering the imperial contribution,76 The
Irish Statesman’s frustration boiled over :
The truth is that Captain Gwynn, who is a courageous minority of one in Southern
Ireland, is so anxious that something with the name of settlement should take place that he
is prepared, with pathetic eagerness, to assent to the proposition not merely that half a loaf
is better than no bread, but that half a loaf is better even if it is poisoned.77
The Irish Statesman robustly opposed the bill, claiming that its provisions were
insufficient to meet the nationalist demand for meaningful self-government ;
partition was also regarded as an insult. Clearly, Gwynn had few allies in Ireland.
While the IRA’s armed campaign and Sinn Fe´in’s political ascendancy gravely
weakened moderate nationalism from 1919 to 1921, internal divisions caused
by Gwynn’s stance, and an inability to comprehend partition, rendered the
Dominion League impotent.
The Government of Ireland Bill faced additional challenges emanating from
the British government. The late spring of 1920 witnessed a dramatic shake-up of
71 Freeman’s Journal, 5 Mar. 1920. 72 Observer, 14 Mar. 1920. 73 Irish Times, 5 Mar. 1920.
74 Plunkett diaries (microfilm), 5 Mar. 1920, BCL.
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the administration in Dublin Castle, with the arrival of the senior civil servants,
Sir John Anderson, Alfred ‘Andy’ Cope, and Mark Sturgis, who obtained control
of the Irish executive from Lord French. A clear ‘carrot and stick ’ strategy
thereafter emerged from Dublin Castle, which was a marked transformation from
the confused inactivity of British policy in Ireland the previous year.78 The mis-
sion of Anderson, Cope, and Sturgis was to extend peace feelers towards Sinn
Fe´in ; this was accompanied by the arrival in Ireland of the notorious Black and
Tans and Auxiliaries to combat the IRA. As the newly appointed commander-in-
chief, Sir Nevil Macready, later put it, Lloyd George wished to encourage better
relations between the government and Sinn Fe´in whilst simultaneously making it
explicit ‘ that a continuance of the campaign of assassination would necessitate
measures more drastic than any which had been hitherto enforced’.79 Whilst
this dual strategy was not unproblematic on the ground, it also undermined
the already unpopular Government of Ireland Bill, which remained on the
Westminster agenda.
Gwynn tied himself further to the partition scheme by accepting the chair-
manship of a small constitutional committee tasked with the unenviable challenge
of suggesting amendments to make the bill more palatable to nationalist opinion.
The Irish Statesman scathingly attacked this amendment group, which it argued
threatened to convey the false impression that Irish nationalism was behind the
proposals, bar several minor modifications.80 A short-lived war of words between
Gwynn and the Dominion League’s Henry Harrison erupted over the pages of
several newspapers. Harrison, an old Parnellite, informed The Irish Times that the
Dominion League would have ‘no truck with a bill designed to administer the
coup de graˆce to the indivisible nationhood of Ireland’.81 Gwynn conceded that the
amendment group lacked the support of nationalist Ireland, but hoped to use his
status to influence public opinion.82 The bill, he reasserted, should be taken ser-
iously in Ireland, as it could lead to a fuller measure of freedom: working against
it would undermine this ambition.83
Was Gwynn warranted in adopting such a stance? The reason Harrison’s
criticisms of Gwynn and the Government of Ireland amendment group appeared
so wounding was that they were largely justified. Irish nationalism in all its guises
had long rejected the British proposal to provide Irish self-government. The
Dominion League feared that Gwynn’s prominence in advocating the bill would
undermine any future settlement between Sinn Fe´in and the government, which
would exceed the terms offered. Whilst the logic of the League’s posturing was
clear, it was also a reactionary argument, highlighting the striking inability of
constitutional nationalism to present a feasible alternative settlement. The tone
of League propaganda through 1920 was self-defeating, with no forthcoming
78 Bew, ‘Moderate nationalism’, p. 744.
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constructive policy. For Gwynn, the counter to the Dominion League’s criticisms
was founded on the belief that ‘ the only practical alternative to the Bill is going on
as we are ’.84 This was not an option for Gwynn, as he expressed in his desire to
lead public opinion, rather than to reflect it. He was, however, a leader without
followers.
Gwynn did try to render the bill more satisfactory to Irish nationalists. He led
a deputation to meet Long at Westminster in May: amongst the amendments
forwarded was an imaginative plan to establish a parliament in Ireland consisting
of northern and southern bicameral legislatures, and increased financial powers,
instead of the two separate entities proposed under the Government of Ireland
Bill. This scheme, however, was politely rebuffed.85 Unable to shift government
thinking, and with the security situation in Ireland deteriorating rapidly during
the summer of 1920, Gwynn joined the demoralized remnants of constitutional
nationalism at a Dominion League-sponsored ‘peace conference ’ in Dublin in
August. This was the last throw of the dice for the League. Its newspaper, The Irish
Statesman, had folded in June due to financial reasons, whilst the organization itself
had all but expired.86 The build-up to the peace conference was, however, more
significant than the event itself, as the government markedly altered its tone in
Irish policy. At the beginning of August, Lloyd George, accompanied by senior
coalition politicians, met businessmen from Dublin and Cork, and constructively
engaged with the idea of dominion status for Ireland.87 Two weeks later, the
prime minister made a major announcement, offering to open talks with Sinn
Fe´in on certain conditions.88 Categorically aimed at republicanism, these in-
itiatives further undermined the appeal of the moderates, despite the apparent
vindication of their platform.
The peace conference was held on 24 August, but failed to benefit from the
momentum of Lloyd George’s perceptible shift in attitude.89 Designed as a forum
to bring together a number of well-known moderate political figures – most no-
tably, Plunkett, Harrison, and Gwynn – and (mostly southern unionist) business
leaders to discuss ways and means to achieve an Irish settlement, many speakers
emphasized the need for immediate self-government to defuse Ireland’s troubles,
with dominion status deemed the most preferential. Characteristically, Gwynn
focused on divisions and their reconciliation: ‘In order to get national self-
government ’, he told the conference, ‘ they must get national unity ’, which was
only achievable by a temporary division of the country. The public airing of views
at the conference, however, only served to underline splits that the partition
question was causing within moderate opinion, with the likes of Gwynn and the
Ulster-born earl of Shaftesbury accepting the need for division of the island,
84 Irish Independent, 7 May 1920. 85 Irish Times, 25 May 1920. 86 Irish Statesman, 19 June 1920.
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which was strenuously opposed by Plunkett and the former Irish Party MP,
Sir Thomas Esmonde.90
The ‘good feeling ’ reported at the peace conference held little sway within
nationalist Ireland. The Freeman’s Journal, which identified strongly with dominion
status, was grudging in appraising the day’s activities. ‘The conference ’, com-
plained an editorial column, ‘avoided the most serious perils in its path. ’
Particular criticism was directed toward the lack of any practical outcome: no
new party, no adopted formulas or schemes.91 Indeed, as the government was
informed, the conference could only agree on one unanimous resolution, which
called for the immediate release of Terence MacSwiney, the lord mayor of Cork
and IRA commander, from Brixton Gaol.92 MacSwiney was one of the first
republicans to be convicted under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act of
1920, which brought most offences within the jurisdiction of courts martial,
thereby significantly militarizing policing in Ireland. MacSwiney had begun a
hunger-strike several days after his imprisonment, from which he died in
October. The MacSwiney case was a public relations disaster for the government,
as it not only antagonized almost all shades of non-unionist opinion in Ireland
and Britain, but also provided a ruinous backdrop for a ‘peace conference ’ of
moderates. A deputation representing the conference interviewed a number of
Dublin Castle officials at the end of August, with its agenda dominated by the
potential fallouts of the hunger-striking by MacSwiney and other Cork IRA
men.93 In September, Lloyd George received a telegram from the peace confer-
ence ‘ standing committee ’, appealing for the release of the hunger-strikers as an
‘ indispensable condition’ for peace and ‘on the grounds of humanity ’.94 Lloyd
George, however, proved implacable, and nothing more was heard from the
peace conference.
I I I
As George Bernard Shaw later declared, ‘ [t]error produces nothing but counter
terror and terror again endlessly, like a circulating decimal ’.95 The introduction
of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries into the Irish melting pot in the summer of
1920 would have provided Shaw with a classic example of this cycle. Comprised
of British ex-soldiers, the Tans were wholly inadequate for civil policing ; even
senior Auxiliaries were unclear whether their force was a military or policing
body.96 With the support of the ‘police advisor ’ in Ireland, General Hugh Tudor,
the Tans carried out reprisal attacks against presumed republicans, communities,
and property, with disastrous consequences for wider opinion. Gwynn captured
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the fearful mood that permeated Ireland following their arrival in his book, The
Irish situation : ‘There were now two terrors in Ireland. It would be difficult to say
whether the community at large was more afraid of the police or the gunmen. ’97
British reprisals made headline news in Britain with the Black and Tan ‘sack’ of
Balbriggan, near Dublin: responding to the assassination of a RIC officer by the
IRA, the Tans killed several men and destroyed a number of properties in the
small town. The ‘sack’ made ‘sensational headlines ’ in the British newspapers
and attracted universal condemnation.98 Writing for The Observer shortly after-
wards, Gwynn was more circumspect. He included a section with a sub-heading
‘This week’s reprisals ’, citing Balbriggan as only one amongst others in a ghastly
list, which also included incidents in Galway, Limerick, and Clare.99 Plainly,
Gwynn wanted The Observer’s readership to understand that Balbriggan was not
an isolated case.
Gwynn pressed for martial law as an alternative to police reprisals in the
struggle against the IRA throughout the autumn and winter of 1920, on the
grounds that such a strategy ‘would be less barbarous and brutal and far less
demoralizing than the present anarchic and futile campaign of revenge’.100 While
Gwynn argued the case for a new military policy, he was also keen to draw
attention to the underlying catalyst for its need: the lack of self-government in
Ireland. As the security situation deteriorated further, Gwynn wrote in November
that, without the immediate grant of home rule to Ireland, ‘martial law will by
itself achieve nothing’.101 This claim was made with an eye on Westminster,
where the Government of Ireland Bill was reaching the end of its legislative
journey. Gwynn was unrepentant in his continued advocacy of the measure,
appealing to nationalists to ‘make the best and not the worst of it ’, after lamenting
that the bill’s passage through parliament was ‘a fact which impresses nobody in
Ireland’.102 Nationalist Ireland did not have any incentive to support the partition
proposals – a point reinforced by Lloyd George’s apparent conversion to the idea
of dominion status.
The first elections under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act were fixed
for May 1921. At the end of 1920, Gwynn complained to Lloyd George that the
government was ‘neglecting to advertise ’ the new act, a fact not unrelated to the
prospects of a deal between the government and Sinn Fe´in.103 In the first few
months of 1921, Gwynn’s Observer articles struck an increasingly sombre tone, as
he accepted the fact that although Ireland had finally won home rule after dec-
ades of nationalist struggle, it was a pyrrhic victory, given Sinn Fe´in’s resistance to
its terms. Despite its flaws, Gwynn maintained that the new southern parliament
should be supported: as he put it, ‘ satisfactory Home Rule will in effect have to be
97 Stephen Gwynn, The Irish situation (London, 1921), pp. 84–5.
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won through unsatisfactory Home Rule ’.104 Linking the establishment of home
rule in Ireland with disbandment of the hated Black and Tans was the last
practical policy that Gwynn encouraged the government to adopt in a desperate
move to energize moderate opinion alienated by the paramilitary policing of the
crown forces. Gwynn firmly informed Kerr that the Tans must go: ‘ the Act
cannot conceivably be worked without that riddance. With this inducement, a
majority for working the Act might conceivably be obtained. Without it, it is
ridiculous to expect it. ’105 As the war continued, the potential of such a move was,
however, unrealized as the Tans became as much a part of the problem as the
solution.
The tone of Gwynn’s Observer column became increasingly grave throughout
the spring of 1921, as he condemned the cheapening of life through the IRA’s
targeting of ex-servicemen and the British force’s disregard for the safety of non-
combatants.106 Once more, Gwynn decided that it was time for action. With his
focus on the May election to the new institutions created by the Government of
Ireland Act, Gwynn contacted Lord Midleton – as he had done in the aftermath
of the December 1918 election – to gain a hearing for a new political party.107 On
5 March, Gwynn met Midleton and another southern unionist leader, Lord
Oranmore and requested that they pool their combined resources. ‘The time has
come’, Gwynn told the unionist chiefs, ‘when moderate men in Ireland of various
shades of religious and political belief ought to come together and organize in
order to be able to put forward candidates at the coming Election for a
Parliament in Southern Ireland’. Gwynn believed that the silent majority who
opposed violence in Ireland would rally to this call, but what was needed was
leadership. A new ‘Centre Party ’, with Midleton at its head (‘his name as leader
would carry great weight ’) was the formula Gwynn promoted. Although
Midleton listened sympathetically, he rejected the proposals, just as he had dis-
carded Gwynn’s invitation to play a leading role in the first incarnation of the
Centre Party.108 Deflated, Gwynn left the meeting with no organization to contest
the elections. A further blow came in March when Kerr stood down as Lloyd
George’s private secretary, thereby severing Gwynn’s informal line into the inner
circle of the government. Journalism and writing were now Gwynn’s only public
outlets, as the last political door slammed in his face.
I V
The 1921 elections were contested by Sinn Fe´in, but not in support of the new
institutions. The political wing of republicanism won every seat in Southern
Ireland (bar four university seats) without contest, returning a new underground
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Da´il and rendering the southern parliament stillborn. In Northern Ireland, Ulster
unionism swept the board, winning forty of the fifty-two seats. ‘All the features in
the political landscape are obscured by the fog of war’, Gwynn reflected. ‘The
elections have revealed nothing of the facts concerning ‘‘Southern Ireland’’ ex-
cept that the present system of government is held in detestation. ’109 Gwynn’s
ideal scenario, which was framed while the Government of Ireland Bill was
passing through Westminster in 1920, was that if Ireland were given institutions
that respected the competing claims of self-determination on the island, moderate
men would come forward and guide the northern and southern parliaments
towards a unity of purpose. The realities of May 1921 were as far removed from
this hope as possible.
Gwynn lamented the failure of constitutional nationalists to contest the 1921
elections, while acknowledging the climate of fear which ‘deterred most voters
from supporting opposition to Republicanism’.110 The violent background was
thus, in this reading, a prominent reason in rationalizing Sinn Fe´in’s sweep of
southern Ireland, thereby nullifying Gwynn’s brand of constitutional politics.
What such an interpretation disregards, however, is the genuine depth of feeling
within all wings of nationalism against the Government of Ireland Act, a fact that
Gwynn could not overturn. Travelling through Ireland during April and May
1921, the English journalist, Wilfred Ewart, failed to find one nationalist who
supported the government’s plans. Instead, he repeatedly found a call for at least
dominion home rule, suggesting that pace Sinn Fe´in’s doctrinal republicanism, the
position throughout the country at large remained fluid, if much more advanced
than Gwynn’s.111 A compromise between British imperialism and Irish national-
ism was possible from this vantage point, but not on the basis of the 1920 legis-
lation.
The compromise arrived in the form of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December
1921, granted three-quarters of Ireland dominion status (to be called the Irish Free
State), and maintained partition, albeit with the establishment of a boundary
commission to rule on the position of the border at a later date. Sinn Fe´in
achieved a settlement closer to the ideal of the Dominion League than that de-
clared in the 1916 proclamation of the Irish republic, a dilution of ideology which
would result in bitter civil war. Given the noises emanating from government
circles through 1920 and 1921, coupled with the green-tinged pragmatism dis-
played by key sections of the republican leadership, the Treaty’s terms are un-
surprising. The crucial point is that it took Sinn Fe´in to negotiate the settlement
and to bring public opinion with it. For all their good intentions, Gwynn and the
Dominion League could not appeal to the masses in a time of revolution, despite
being largely vindicated by the Treaty’s terms.
Not that Gwynn was bitter. He welcomed the Treaty, and looked forward, at
last, to self-government in the twenty-six counties. He staunchly supported the
109 Gwynn, Irish situation, pp. 86–7. 110 Ibid., p. 87.
111 Wilfred Ewart, A journey in Ireland, 1921 (London, 1922), pp. 19, 42, 61, 83, 85, and 114.
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first government of the Free State, greatly admiring its character in facing down
the threat from the anti-Treaty IRA.112 But the ironies of revolution were also
apparent. Sitting in the press box during the Free State’s first parliamentary
meeting in 1922, Gwynn’s mind wandered ‘ to the modest family vault in
Wexford, where we left John Redmond’.113 In a home rule parliament, with
Redmond as prime minister, Gwynn could have expected to play a senior role in
the first Irish government since the Act of Union. Now, following the defeat of
Redmondism, a new generation of Irish politicians celebrated their success
in achieving self-government without acknowledging the groundwork laid by
constitutional nationalism since the days of Isaac Butt. Even more distressingly for
Gwynn, partition had become more entrenched by the excesses of both Irish
republicanism and Ulster unionism; a further irony lay in the fact that the civil
war in the south was fought over the limitations of the granted autonomy, rather
than the north’s position outside of it. For all of Gwynn’s emphasis on the ques-
tion of Ulster through 1919 to 1921, it was not the crunch issue for republicanism.
Despite the achievement of self-government, it was difficult for Gwynn to avoid
speculating on what ‘might have been’. In Gwynn’s retrospective accounts, he
came to see the Easter Rising as the tipping point in the fate of constitutional
nationalism. This explained the failure of moderate politics after the Rising:
the unchaining of ‘old hates ’ in 1916 served to render impotent the conciliatory
nationalism he championed.114 In this reading, the villain was Sinn Fe´in : mod-
erate nationalism was destroyed primarily by republican myopia, albeit aided
by British blunders and unionist intransigence. Nationalism’s unwillingness to
concede partition to Ulster unionism was the source of great turbulence in
Ireland; but Gwynn’s support for such a strategy – which many found abhor-
rent – served to divide the very forces of political moderation that he believed
were crucial in hauling the country back from the chaos of revolution. The
Dominion League was appalled by Gwynn’s stance in relation to Ulster ; yet in its
public criticisms of Gwynn, the League betrayed its political bankruptcy in ad-
dressing the northern question. Within the context of revolutionary violence and
Sinn Fe´in’s political dominance, the failure of moderate politics comes into
sharper focus. Divided, demoralized, and disregarded, moderate nationalism was
both a master and a slave of its fate during the war of independence.
Stephen Gwynn was the foremost of the last home rule generation to play an
active political role in Ireland between 1919 and 1921, and his experiences
illuminate the death of the ideal of national reconciliation: Redmondism without
Redmond was not to be. Despite his position on the ‘ losing side ’, Gwynn greatly
enriched the debates about Ireland’s future during the period under question. In
establishing the Centre Party and propagating federalism, to joining the
Dominion League, then supporting the government’s partition scheme, Gwynn
shifted positions in reaction to the inadequacies of the major political players in
Ireland and Britain. His weekly Observer column during the revolutionary years
112 Observer, July 1922–Apr. 1923. 113 Ibid., 10 Dec. 1922. 114 Ibid., 4 Apr. 1926.
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offered a critical account of both militant republicanism and the self-defeating
nature of the harsh British reprisal campaign. It was the violence of the IRA,
according to Gwynn, which entrenched the Irish divisions that partition merely
reflected. Gwynn’s political thought was complex, if out of tune among con-
temporaries. His drive to resurrect nationalist realism was violated by republican
idealism: Gwynn’s Ireland, based on reconciliation and a mature recognition
of diverse political opinions, was lost in the chaos of revolution, and partition
became its perennial epitaph. His ‘revolution ’ is one that has been written out of
the Irish story, since he voiced unpalatable views regarding Ulster and the British
state to his fellow nationalists. His defeat, however, offers an implicit vindication
of his efforts. Relations between, and within, the two Irelands that emerged after
1922 lacked Gwynn’s conciliatory and pluralistic touch; subsequent events would
reveal the damaging extent of this loss.
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